Software Security

Software security is the idea of engineering software so that it continues to function correctly under malicious attack. Most technologists acknowledge this undertaking’s importance, but they need some help in understanding how to tackle it. This new department aims to provide that help by exploring software security best practices.

The software security field is a relatively new one. The first books and academic classes on the topic appeared in 2001, demonstrating how recently developers, architects, and computer scientists have started systematically studying how to build secure software. The field’s recent appearance is one reason why best practices are neither widely adopted nor obvious.

A central and critical aspect of the computer security problem is a software problem. Software defects with security ramifications—including implementation bugs such as buffer overflows and design flaws such as inconsistent error handling—promise to be with us for years. All too often, malicious intruders can hack into systems by exploiting software defects.1 Internet-enabled software applications present the most common security risk encountered today, with software’s ever-expanding complexity and extensibility adding further fuel to the fire. By any measure, security holes in software are common, and the problem is growing: CERT Coordination Center identified 4,129 reported vulnerabilities in 2003 (a 70 percent increase over 2002, and an almost fourfold increase since 2001).2,3

Software security best practices leverage good software engineering practice and involve thinking about security early in the software life cycle, knowing and understanding common threats (including language-based flaws and pitfalls), designing for security, and subjecting all software artifacts to thorough objective risk analyses and testing. Let’s look at how software security fits into the overall concept of operational security and examine some best practices for building security in.

...versus application security

Application security means many different things to many different people. In IEEE Security & Privacy magazine, it has come to mean the protection of software after it’s already built. Although the notion of protecting software is an important one, it’s just plain easier to protect something that is defect-free than something riddled with vulnerabilities.

Pondering the question, “What is the most effective way to protect software?” can help untangle software security and application security. On one hand, software security is about building secure software: designing software to be secure, making sure that software is secure, and educating software developers, architects, and users about how to build secure things. On the other hand, application security is about protecting software and the systems that software runs in a post facto way, after development is complete. Issues critical to this subfield include sandboxing code (as the Java virtual machine does), protecting against malicious code, obfuscating code, locking down executables, monitoring programs as they run (especially their input), enforcing the software use policy with technology, and dealing with extensible systems.

Application security follows naturally from a network-centric approach to security, by embracing standard approaches such as penetrate and patch4 and input filtering (trying to block malicious input) and by providing value in a reactive way. Put succinctly, application security is based primarily on finding and fixing known security problems after they’ve been exploited in fielded systems. Software security—the process of designing, building, and testing software for security—identifies and expunges problems in the software itself. In this way, software security practitioners attempt to build software that can withstand attack proactively. Let me give you a specific example: although there is some real value in stopping buffer overflow attacks by observing HTTP traffic as it arrives over port 80, a superior approach is to fix the broken code and avoid the buffer overflow completely.

...as practiced by operations people

One reason that application security technologies such as firewalls have evolved the way they have is because...
operations people dreamed them up. In most corporations and large orga-
nizations, security is the domain of the in-
frastucture people who set up and main-
tain firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, and antivirus engines (all of
which are reactive technologies).

However, these people are opera-
tors, not builders. Given the fact that
they don’t build the software they
have to operate, it’s no surprise that
their approach is to move standard
security techniques “down” to the
desktop and application levels. The
gist of the idea is to protect vulnera-
bility things (in this case, software)
from attack, but the problem is that
vulnerabilities in the software let ma-
lieous hackers skirt standard security
technologies with impunity. If this
were not the case, then the security
vulnerability problem would not be
expanding the way that it is. Clearly,
this emphasizes the need to get
builders to do a better job on the
software in the first place.

Protecting a network full of
evolving software is difficult (even if
the software is not patched every five
minutes). If software were in some
sense self-protecting (by being de-
signed defensively and more pro-
perly tested from a security perspec-
tive) or at least less riddled with
vulnerabilities, running a secure net-
work could become easier and more
cost effective.

In the short run, we clearly—
desperately—must make progress on
both fronts. But in the long run, we
must figure out ways to build easier-
to-defend code. Software security is
about helping builders do a better
job so that operators end up with an
easier job.

...in the software
development life cycle

On the road to making such a funda-
mental change, we must first agree
that software security is not security
software. This is a subtle point often
lost on development people who
tend to focus on functionality. Obvi-
ously, there are security functions in
the world, and most modern soft-
ware includes security features, but
adding features such as SSL (for
cryptographically protecting com-
communications) does not present a
complete solution to the security
problem. Software security is a sys-
tem-wide issue that takes into ac-
count both security mechanisms
(such as access control) and design
for security (such as robust design
that makes software attacks difficult).
Sometimes these overlap, but often
they don’t.

Put another way, security is an emer-
gent property of a software system. A
security problem is more likely to
arise because of a problem in a stan-
dard-issue part of the system (say, the
interface to the database module)
then in some given security feature.
This is an important reason why sof-

New department

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his department is about building systems that include properly
constructed software. Past issues of this magazine have called
attention to the serious problems software practitioners face when it
comes to security. Most security researchers agree that we have a
pressing problem. In “A Call to Arms: Look Beyond the Horizon,” 1
Jeannette Wing includes “software design and security” as one of
three critical areas to tackle if security research is to make progress. In
“From the Ground Up: The DIMACS Software Security Workshop,” 2
introduce the software problem, discuss trends that demonstra-
ate the problem’s growth, and introduce the philosophy of proac-
tively attacking the problem at the architectural level.

The good news is that technologists and commercial vendors
all acknowledge that the software security problem exists. The bad
news is that we have barely begun to instantiate solutions, and
many proposed solutions are impotent. Not surprisingly, early
commercial solutions to the software security problem tend to take
an operational stance—that is, they focus on solving the software
security problem through late lifecycle activities such as firewalling
(at the application level), penetration testing, and patch man-
agement. Because security has tended to be operational in nature
(especially in the corporate world where IT security revolves
around the proper placement and monitoring of network security
apparatus), this operational tack is only natural. This leads to a
bifurcation of approaches when it comes to software, into appli-
cation security and software security. 3

The core of the problem is that building systems to be secure
cannot be accomplished by using an operations mindset. Instead,
we must revisit all phases of system development and make sure
that security engineering is present in each of them. When it comes
to software, this means understanding: requirements, architecture,
design, coding, testing, validation, measurement, and main-
tenance. This is a far cry from code review and black-box testing!

Essentially, this department is about security best practices from
all phases of the software life cycle. My plan is to coauthor a set of
articles with software security practitioners about software security
best practices from the real world. You’re welcome and
encouraged to help!

References
1. J. Wing, “A Call to Action: Look Beyond the Horizon,” IEEE Security & Pri-
2. G. McGraw, “From the Ground Up: The DIMACS Software Security Work-
practices will be cycled through more than once as the software evolves. In the picture, most organizations follow an iterative approach today, which means that best practices can be applied to various software artifacts.

![Figure 1. Software security best practices applied to various software artifacts.](image)

Although the artifacts are laid out according to a traditional waterfall model in this picture, most organizations follow an iterative approach today, which means that best practices will be cycled through more than once as the software evolves.

Figure 1 specifies one set of best practices and shows how software practitioners can apply them to the various software artifacts produced during software development. In the rest of this section, I’ll touch on best practices. As this department unfolds, we’ll cover each of these areas in much greater detail.

Security should be explicitly at the requirements level. Security requirements must cover both overt functional security (say, the use of applied cryptography) and emergent characteristics. One great way to cover the emergent security space is to build abuse cases. Similar to use cases, abuse cases describe the system’s behavior under attack; building them requires explicit coverage of what should be protected, from whom, and for how long.

At the design and architecture level, a system must be coherent and present a unified security architecture that takes into account security principles (such as the principle of least privilege). Designers, architects, and analysts must clearly document assumptions and identify possible attacks. At both the specification-based architecture stage and at the class-hierarchy design stage, risk analysis is a necessity—security analysts should uncover and rank risks so that mitigation can begin. Disregarding risk analysis at this level will lead to costly problems down the road. External analysis (outside the design team) is often necessary.

At the code level, we should focus on implementation flaws, especially those that static analysis tools—tools that scan source code for common vulnerabilities—can discover. Several vendors now address this space, and tools should see market-driven improvement and rapid maturity later this year. As stated earlier, code review is a necessary, but not sufficient, practice for achieving secure software. Security bugs (especially in C and C++) can be deadly, but architectural flaws are just as big a problem.

Security testing must encompass two strategies: testing security functionality with standard functional testing techniques, and risk-based security testing based on attack patterns and threat models. A good security test plan (with traceability back to requirements) uses both strategies. Security problems aren’t always apparent, even when we probe a system directly, so standard-issue quality assurance is unlikely to uncover all the pressing security issues.

Penetration testing is also useful, especially if an architectural risk analysis is specifically driving the tests. The advantage of penetration testing is that it gives a good understanding of fielded software in its real environment. However, any black-box penetration testing that doesn’t take the software architecture into account probably won’t uncover anything deeply interesting about software risk. Software that falls prey to canned black-box testing—which simplistic application security testing tools on the market today practice—is truly bad. This means that passing a cursory penetration test reveals very little about your real security posture, but failing an easy canned penetration test tells you that you’re in very deep trouble indeed.

Operations people should carefully monitor fielded systems during use for security breaks. Simply put, attacks will happen, regardless of the strength of design and implementation, so monitoring software behavior is an excellent defensive technique. Knowledge gained by understanding attacks and exploits should be cycled back into the development organization, and security practitioners should...
explicitly track both threat models and attack patterns.

Note that risks crop up during all stages of the software life cycle, so a constant risk analysis thread, with recurring risk tracking and monitoring activities, is highly recommended.

...as a multidisciplinary effort

By and large, software architects, developers, and testers remain blithely unaware of the software security problem. One essential form of best practices involves training software development staff on critical software security issues. The most effective form of training begins with a description of the problem and demonstrates its impact and importance. Beyond awareness, more advanced software security training should offer coverage of security engineering, design principles and guidelines, implementation risks, design flaws, analysis techniques, software exploits, and security testing. Each best practice called out earlier is a good candidate for in-depth training.

Software security can and should borrow from other disciplines in computer science and software engineering when developing and evolving best practices. Of particular relevance are

• security requirements engineering,
• design for security, software architecture, and architectural analysis,
• security analysis, security testing, and use of the Common Criteria,
• guiding principles for software security and case studies in design and analysis,
• auditing software for implementation risks, architectural risks, automated tools, and technology developments (code scanning, information flow and so on), and
• common implementation risks (buffer overflows, race conditions, randomness, authentication systems, access control, applied cryptography, and trust management).

Much work remains to be done in each of the best practice areas, but some basic practical solutions should be adapted from areas of more mature research.

This department’s goal is to cover many of the best practices sketched out here in much greater detail. You can do two things to help: send feedback to me regarding which best practices you want to see covered first, and volunteer to help develop an article on any individual best practice outlined here. With your help, we can create a decent understanding of software security best practices that can be practically applied and make a big impact on the software security problem.

As the trinity of trouble—connectedness, complexity, and extensibility—continues to impact software security in a negative way, we must begin to grapple with the problem in a more reasonable fashion. Integrating a decent set of best practices into the software development life cycle is an excellent way to do this. Although software security as a field has much maturing to do, it has much to offer to those practitioners interested in striking at the heart of security problems.

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References