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	<title>Comments on: Cigital&#8217;s Touchpoints versus Microsoft&#8217;s SDL</title>
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	<link>http://www.cigital.com/justice-league-blog/2007/03/08/cigitals-touchpoints-versus-microsofts-sdl/</link>
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		<title>By: jOHN</title>
		<link>http://www.cigital.com/justice-league-blog/2007/03/08/cigitals-touchpoints-versus-microsofts-sdl/#comment-14</link>
		<dc:creator>jOHN</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Mar 2007 16:33:08 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Gary, excellent post. Some of our larger customers make a pilgrimage out to Microsoft, look around, and then come back and ask me, &quot;How much of SDL should _my_ org. be using today?&quot; Like a previous entry indicated, most people obsess about the Joneses; Microsoft plays the Joneses part well.

A few things struck me, given what I know about the differences between what Microsoft documents and what people familiar with SDL (inside and outside of Redmond) do in practice:

1) Developers often see true modeling tools, like Prefix, as too hard to set up and use;  “Don’t bother???, some think. I perceive a rift between those who shepherd these tools and the developer-masses on this tool’s value. I, personally, think tools like Prefix rock.

Your organization needs to decide whether or not they want quick(er) adoption of a parser-based tool, or to spend the time setting up and tuning a modeling tool when it chooses to do code analysis with a tool.

2) Microsoft goes beyond fuzzing (or more complex tool-based integration testing approaches, such as fault injection). Specifically, their data flow diagrams (D.F.D.s) written as part of Threat Modeling techniques drive security testing I’ve witnessed: still at the API-level though.

Your organization needs to decide how it&#039;s going to bolster QA staff, tools, and approach to incorporate security. Microsoft has taken a very design-by-contract approach, it seems, and the addition of Whittaker and his tool-horsepower helps. What strengths can your org. leverage?  

3) Microsoft’s code review seems reminiscent of Fagan. They seem to implement it based on a growing checklist of previously found testing bugs, security standards, and that’s it. Our code review (in practice) seems much heavier-weight, incorporating understanding of software&#039;s design and aspects of dynamic testing.

I firmly believe your organization needs to go well-beyond code print outs and walkthroughs when it does code reviews. Any more on this subject would be its own entry.

4) Microsoft, I believe, spends much time writing security requirements. I’m largely shocked they haven’t adopted something closer to our misuse/abuse cases formally—as it would fill a gap in their Threat Modeling exercise and seems to fit with their developer-driven software development culture well.
 
Microsoft has, in general, tackled Security within the development lifecycle like a subset of Quality in terms of methodological approach. They think about things from a perspective deeply steeped within their own product suites, OS, and language platform--as they should. No where else (not even in some embedded device shops) will you see so integrated a technology stack. There’s a lot of contextual baggage that comes with that.

Everyone lauds Microsoft&#039;s security efforts, I&#039;l join in: Good job. The fact that they&#039;ve published books on how and what they&#039;re doing also helps.  For those of you trying to absorb SDL, think about what Microsoft was trying to accomplish in each step and figure out how to apply the &#039;spirit&#039; of that guidance to your organization in a culturally compatible way rather than copying SDL wholesale.
-jOHN</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Gary, excellent post. Some of our larger customers make a pilgrimage out to Microsoft, look around, and then come back and ask me, &#8220;How much of SDL should _my_ org. be using today?&#8221; Like a previous entry indicated, most people obsess about the Joneses; Microsoft plays the Joneses part well.</p>
<p>A few things struck me, given what I know about the differences between what Microsoft documents and what people familiar with SDL (inside and outside of Redmond) do in practice:</p>
<p>1) Developers often see true modeling tools, like Prefix, as too hard to set up and use;  “Don’t bother???, some think. I perceive a rift between those who shepherd these tools and the developer-masses on this tool’s value. I, personally, think tools like Prefix rock.</p>
<p>Your organization needs to decide whether or not they want quick(er) adoption of a parser-based tool, or to spend the time setting up and tuning a modeling tool when it chooses to do code analysis with a tool.</p>
<p>2) Microsoft goes beyond fuzzing (or more complex tool-based integration testing approaches, such as fault injection). Specifically, their data flow diagrams (D.F.D.s) written as part of Threat Modeling techniques drive security testing I’ve witnessed: still at the API-level though.</p>
<p>Your organization needs to decide how it&#8217;s going to bolster QA staff, tools, and approach to incorporate security. Microsoft has taken a very design-by-contract approach, it seems, and the addition of Whittaker and his tool-horsepower helps. What strengths can your org. leverage?  </p>
<p>3) Microsoft’s code review seems reminiscent of Fagan. They seem to implement it based on a growing checklist of previously found testing bugs, security standards, and that’s it. Our code review (in practice) seems much heavier-weight, incorporating understanding of software&#8217;s design and aspects of dynamic testing.</p>
<p>I firmly believe your organization needs to go well-beyond code print outs and walkthroughs when it does code reviews. Any more on this subject would be its own entry.</p>
<p>4) Microsoft, I believe, spends much time writing security requirements. I’m largely shocked they haven’t adopted something closer to our misuse/abuse cases formally—as it would fill a gap in their Threat Modeling exercise and seems to fit with their developer-driven software development culture well.</p>
<p>Microsoft has, in general, tackled Security within the development lifecycle like a subset of Quality in terms of methodological approach. They think about things from a perspective deeply steeped within their own product suites, OS, and language platform&#8211;as they should. No where else (not even in some embedded device shops) will you see so integrated a technology stack. There’s a lot of contextual baggage that comes with that.</p>
<p>Everyone lauds Microsoft&#8217;s security efforts, I&#8217;l join in: Good job. The fact that they&#8217;ve published books on how and what they&#8217;re doing also helps.  For those of you trying to absorb SDL, think about what Microsoft was trying to accomplish in each step and figure out how to apply the &#8216;spirit&#8217; of that guidance to your organization in a culturally compatible way rather than copying SDL wholesale.<br />
-jOHN</p>
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