by Amit Sethi on Friday, March 7, 2014
Recently, Apple released a patch for a bug in its SSL handshake implementation on iOS and Mac OS X that allowed attackers to intercept SSL traffic originating from vulnerable devices. It turns out that the GnuTLS library also contained a bug that was patched on February 27, 2014; this bug also allows attackers to intercept… Read More
by Amit Sethi on Tuesday, February 25, 2014
You may have heard about the recently publicly disclosed vulnerability (http://support.apple.com/kb/HT6147) in Apple iOS. Let’s take a look at the goto fail details as well as at who is affected. Vulnerability Details As the code at http://opensource.apple.com/source/Security/Security-55471/libsecurity_ssl/lib/sslKeyExchange.c shows, there is a bug in the implementation of the SSLVerifySignedServerKeyExchange function. Although the goto fail has been… Read More
by jOHN on Sunday, February 16, 2014
Last Wednesday I spoke about password storage security in a Cigital at the WhiteBoard session. Fate has allowed a publicized password breach within a few days prior to these talks nearly without fail and, with the hack of Yahoo’s 3rd party database more than a week in the rear-view, I was a bit self-conscious. Cue… Read More
by paco on Tuesday, February 4, 2014
The UK’s NHS web site (http://www.nhs.uk/), or to be precise, links embedded in it, have been infecting visitors with malware. At the end of the day, it was probably a straightforward typo in the coding of the web page. What lessons can we learn here? How could we have stopped that? Sadly, there’s not much… Read More
by Amit Sethi on Wednesday, January 29, 2014
Although the NativePRNG uses SHA1PRNG, it overrides SHA1PRNG configuration options by explicitly seeding it using the output of /dev/urandom. The main issue to be aware of when using the NativePRNG is that calling generateSeed() could cause your code to hang.
by jOHN on Tuesday, January 21, 2014
For years our assessments have discovered insecure mechanisms for password storage. Though well-intentioned developers often put a good deal of thought into schemes they seldom resist attack. Not surprising–applying the appropriate cryptographic primitives effectively proves challenging for many security practitioners. Available material, such as the simple OWASP Cheat Sheet and more thorough Threat Model, help… Read More
by gem on Friday, January 17, 2014
Ever since the publication of Building Secure Software in 2001 (and really even before that), Cigital has emphasized the importance of focusing on software security design flaws (in the architecture). Of course finding bugs in code is lots easier, and we have made some great progress with static analysis in the last decade. (Don’t forget… Read More
by Amit Sethi on Wednesday, January 15, 2014
The sun.security.provider.SecureRandom implementation is one of the most complex SecureRandom implementations in terms of the ways it can be configured and used. Here are a few issues you should be aware of.
by Amit Sethi on Monday, January 6, 2014
Can calls to SecureRandom be blocked? A look into several SecureRandom implementations (four in Oracle JRE, and six in IBM JRE) uncovered at least three security issues related to SecureRandom: Call Sequence, Blocking, and Internal Seeding Mechanism.
by gem on Monday, December 2, 2013
2013 was a super fast year. In major Cigital highlights, we raised some money and cleaned up our cap table. We launched BSIMM-V. We hosted two BSIMM Community Conferences, one in London for the EU types in March and another in Virginia in November. And while we did all of that, Cigital grew over 25%. Holy cow.